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Introduction  
 
After a considerable gestation period, the Fraud Act 2006 came into force on 
15th January 20071. It introduces a new general offence of fraud in section 1, 
with a maximum penalty of 10 years‟ imprisonment. This offence can be 
committed by false representation (section 2), failure to disclose information 
(section 3) and by abuse of position (section 4)2. The introduction of general 
offences is intended to provide a substantial scope for ensure that 
technologically focused crime can be targeted by this provision. This covers 
„newer‟ offences such as inter alia phishing and spoofing.  
 
However, it is argued that whilst the sentiments behind the new Act are to be 
welcomed, it is argued that there are a number of deficiencies in the new Act, 
which could lead to considerable problems. The deception offences in 
sections 15, 15A, 16 and 20(2) of the Theft Act 19683 and sections 1 and 2 of 
the Theft Act 19784 are repealed. Initially, this is to be welcomed as there is a 
shift in focus away from deception problems (notably that deception of a 
machine or computer is not legally possible5) it moves towards the concept of 
dishonesty, as defined in R v Ghosh (1982)6 The two-stage test was outlined 
by Lord Lane, who stated:  
 
“In determining whether the prosecution has proved that the defendant 
was acting dishonestly, a jury must first of all decide whether according 
to the ordinary standards of reasonable and honest people what was 
                                                 
1
 A full version of the Fraud Act 2006 can be found at: http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts2006/ 
20060035.htm.   
2
 There are further new offences included in the Act, such as possessing articles for the use 
in frauds (section 6), making and supplying articles for the use in frauds (section 7) and 
obtaining services dishonestly (section 11), but this article focuses upon the general fraud 
offence.  
3
 Respectively: obtaining property by deception, obtaining a money transfer by deception, 
obtaining a pecuniary advantage by deception and procuring the execution of a valuable 
security by deception 
4
 Respectively: obtaining services by deception and evasion of liability by deception. (A full list 
of repeals and revocations can be found in Schedule 3).  
5
 DPP v Ray [1974] AC 370. Lord Morris stated (at page 384): ”For a deception to take place 
there must be some person or persons who will have been deceived.” Further, in Re London 
and Global Finance Corporation Limited [1903] 1 Ch 728, Buckley J stated (at page 732): “To 
deceive is…to induce a man to believe that a thing is true which is false, and which the 
person practising the deceit knows and believes it to be false.”  
6
 [1982] QB 1053.  
done was dishonest. If it was not dishonest by those standards, that is 
the end of the matter and the prosecution fails. If it was dishonest by 
those standards, then the jury must consider whether the defendant 
himself must have realised that what he was doing by those standards 
dishonest.”7 
 
However, this is problematic in itself as there already exist a number of 
“…powerful criticisms”8 surrounding the Ghosh decision. The Act also makes 
a number of fundamental alterations to the general understanding of fraud. 
The offence moves from being that of a result crime to a conduct crime. This 
has the advantage of the law stepping in at an early stage to prevent further 
criminality, although at the same time provides a completely new concept of 
the criminal act of fraud in a statute that does not provide specific definitions 
of key concepts, such as „fraud‟, „false‟ or „abuse‟.  
 
The purpose of this article is to unravel the key provisions of the Act and to 
examine specifically the likely effect it will have on „e‟-crimes. Whilst Barty and 
Carnell (2005) are of the view that there will be more persecutions for 
technology-related crimes9, it is the contention of the authors that the Act 
poses problems, which may restrict the law‟s ability to cope to online 
criminality.  
 
Rationale for the Act  
 
Arguably, the key reason for the introduction of the Fraud Act was the history 
of complexity and uncertainty concerning offences involving deception. Smith 
spoke about the need to “…tidy up the shamble of section 16 of the Theft Act 
1968”10, while Ormerod is also clear in his criticism as he states:  
 
“The deception offences were notoriously technical. Although 
overlapping, they were over-particularised, creating a hazardous terrain 
for prosecutors who, in charging, could be tripped up by something as 
subtle as the fraudster‟s method of payment. The interpretive difficulties 
were substantial.”11 
 
The problems centred on the case law that has determined that the 
implication within the statutory words which describe the offence is that the 
deception must be played upon a human mind12. Coupled with the interpretive 
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 Ibid, page 1064.  
8
 Ormerod, D The Fraud Act 2006 – Criminalising Lying (March 2007) Criminal Law Review, 
pages 193-219, at page 200.  
9
 “With identity theft and credit card scams a growing concern, the new legislation is likely to 
be welcomed by the financial and banking sector and, once passed, should result in a 
considerable increase in the number of prosecutions of technology related crime.” Barty, S & 
Carnell, P Fraud Bill offers new protection against technology abuse (July 2005) World 
Internet Law Report, volume 6, number 7, pages 20-21, at page 21.  
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 Smith, A. T. H. Reforming Section 16 of the Theft Act (1977) Criminal Law Review, page 
259.??? 
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 Supra n.8, page 194.  
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 Supra n.5.  
difficulties seen in the application of the deception offences13 the judiciary 
were also critical of the state of the law. Edmund-Davies LJ in the case of 
Royal stated:  
 
“Despite the aim of the still-youthful Theft Act to simplify the law, we feel 
that the time has already come to declare that so obscure is section 16 
that it has already created a judicial nightmare.”14 
 
The Law Commission in 2002 published a report entitled „Fraud‟15 and 
commented that due to number of potential statutory provisions, which could 
be used in fraud trials, a number of wider problems could arise. The judicial 
minefield it caused – most notably with technical arguments – led to 
occasional swift responses to plug loopholes. The decision in R v Preddy16 is 
a good example of this (with the focus of the decision being based upon 
whether the mortgage loans were strictly property belonging to another as 
required under section 15 of the Theft Act). The decision in this case led to 
the addition of section 15A of the Theft Act. However, the problem with 
plugging loopholes when they appear is that the law is continually playing 
„catch-up‟ with criminality. The Law Commission refer to the words of Lord 
Hardwicke in 1759, who stated:  
 
“Fraud is infinite, and were a court once to…define strictly the species of 
evidences of it, the jurisdiction would be cramped, and perpetually 
eluded by new schemes which the fertility of man‟s invention would 
contrive”17 
 
Furthermore, the Home Office Consultation Paper on Fraud Law Reform 
argued that the existing statutory provisions relating to fraud were 
“overlapping”, [In a] “…state of untidiness” and fails to define exactly what 
“fraud” means.18 These sentiments are shared by Bainbridge, who referred to 
the deception offences as being “…of doubtful application to computer 
fraud.”19 
 
Academic and judicial criticism aside, there are wider reasons for the 
introduction of new legislation. It is without doubt that in recent years, 
technology-based crimes have been on the increase. The government-backed 
Ger Safe Online Report published in October 200620 suggested the around 
one in ten people (about 3.5 million) in the UK had been the victim of an 
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 The Law Commission Fraud (Report No. 276), July 2002. The Report is available at: 
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rd
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 Supra n.13.  
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 Home Office Consultation Paper Fraud Law Reform May 2004. Available at: 
http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/documents/cons-fraud-law-reform/ [Accessed 23
rd
 May 2007].  
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 Bainbridge, D Criminal law tackles computer fraud and misuse (2007) Computer Law and 
Security Report, Volume 23, Issue 3, pages 276-281, at page 280.  
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 Available at: http://www.getsafeonline.org/media/GSO_Cyber_Report_2006.pdf [Accessed 
24th May 2007]. Get Safe Online is the United Kingdom‟s first internet security awareness 
campaign and is backed by the government and leading industry figures.  
online fraud in 2006, which cost on average £875 per person. Losses related 
to phishing were estimated to have cost £23.2 million in 2005, while identity 
theft continues to increase. Although, it is fair to say that figures relating to 
fraudulent activity are invariably changeable. In the last six months it has been 
reported that UK fraud costs more than £20bn per year,21 while at the same 
time credit card fraud is on the decrease.22 Meanwhile, a survey by 
Infosecurity Europe advises that around one-third of companies do not even 
bother to report their information security crimes and breaches.23 Thus, any 
attempt to provide specific statistics on the relative increase (or decrease) in 
technology-based fraud is fraught with difficultly and almost impossible to 
achieve. What can be stated with some certainty is that the opportunity to 
engage in crime over the Internet or by alternative electronic methods is 
growing, while the ingenuity of perpetrators continues to stretch boundaries. 
The Fraud Act is an attempt to provide flexibility within the legislation by 
providing a broad net where a number of „fraud‟ offences can be caught. 
However, the relative effectiveness of the provisions and the underlying 
principles is doubted – indeed it is the contention of the authors that there are 
wider concerns than simply adding new legislation to an already over-
burdened statute book.  
 
 
Even the most cursory read through of the Fraud Act 2006 reveals two big 
changes to the law of England and Wales.  The first is that fraud is now a 
conduct as opposed to a result crime.  Under the sections of the Theft Acts 
now repealed there had to be the obtaining of a money transfer, or property, 
or a service, as a result of a dishonest deception – the defendant had to gain, 
or the victim had to lose - control or ownership of property.  Without the gain 
or loss, a possible charge of an attempted crime could result, as long as the 
defendant had gone beyond a „more than merely preparatory act‟ towards the 
commission of the full offence24, and subject to the mens rea of intention to 
commit the particular actus reus. The Fraud Act 2006 removes the need for 
gain or loss, or even that a property right be endangered, by focussing solely 
on the conduct of the defendant.  For s2 – likely to be the most widely used 
section, particularly in respect of on-line criminal behaviour – this means that 
a defendant has to dishonestly make a representation which he knows or 
suspects may be untrue or misleading with the the intention to cause a loss to 
another or a gain to himself (or another).25  It can be seen that this modus 
operendii does away with the need for a victim altogether, indeed nobody 
need even believe the false representation made.  Although much internet 
fraud, such as phishing or pharming relies on sheer weight of numbers to 
make it profitable, the Fraud Act catches - the universally trashed „miracle 
weight loss car – diet while you drive!‟ and the much responded to „hot stock 
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 BBC News Press Release UK Fraud costs „top 20bn a year‟ 7
th
 March 2007. Available at: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/6425963.stm [Accessed: 14th March 2007]. 
22
 BBC News Press Release Reduction in card fraud in 2006 14
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 March 207. Available at: 
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 April 2007. Available at: http://www.publictechnology.net/modules.php?op=modload 
&name=News&file=article&sid=8540 [Accessed 10
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 April 2007].  
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 Criminal Attempts Act 1981 s 1(1) 
25
 “Gain” and “loss” are widely defined in s5 FA 2006 
tips from New York‟ - without distinction.  Presumably it is a concern of the 
sentencing judge how much property has been fraudulently gained by the 
false representation, but it clearly is not a requirement, or a concern of s2 
whether any has been gained (or lost) at all. The shift of the fraud offence into 
the realms of the conduct crime should not be underestimated.  Conduct will 
now be caught and criminalised which would not even have sufficed for an 
attempted offence prior to the Act, and as a result fraud has become a very 
wide offence indeed.  In his article on the Law Commission proposals for 
Fraud, Sullivan26 describes the much maligned common law offence of 
conspiracy to defraud as an „offence of startling breadth‟…whose broadness 
is … „both a blessing and a curse‟.  In s2 we may be seeing an offence in 
which the actus reus is still easier to commit.  Conspiracy to defraud is at least 
restrained by the requirement of two or more persons having an „agreement‟27 
– there is no such restraint on s2.  Indeed, a person will not even have to 
send his enticing e-mail into his victims in-box in order to have committed the 
offence, since   
 
„a representation may be regarded as made if it (or anything implying it) is 
submitted in any form to any system or device designed to receive, convey or 
respond to communications (with or without human intervention)‟28 
 
This suggests that a person who has written, but not yet sent, an email which 
he suspects may be untrue or misleading – subject to mens rea - is already 
within the parameters of s2.  The actus reus of the general fraud offence, 
particularly under s2 is shockingly wide – a market stall holder shouting that 
his potatoes are „local‟ when he suspects they may not be, a job interviewee 
who „pads‟ his CV with a (fictional) stint of charity work in a poor region of 
India, a gallery which advertises „genuine Picasso‟s‟ when they have a stock 
of prints to clear and are aware that the strapline may be misleading – all, 
under the FA 2006, have potentially committed the actus reus of fraud by 
making a representation which they know is, or may be untrue or misleading. 
As a move away from the fussy and over-particularised Theft Act offences it is 
a model of straightforward syntax.  The Fraud Act seems to have sewn up the 
loopholes in the TA which have allowed the phishers and pharmers to escape 
and for this t must be welcomed, but a phishing or pharming website has 
already been declared a breach of s3 of the Computer Misuse Act 199029, and 
the net of the Fraud Act may have been spread so wide that it sweeps into it‟s 
mesh that which is not properly called fraud at all.  People shouldn‟t, in an 
ideal world, lie or mislead, but should the job hunter be a fraudster, a 
criminal?  Is he the person the FA was designed to catch?   Is the market 
trader a fraudster? Or has he properly gauged his market and is indulging in a 
little „creative advertising‟?  It is submitted this will come down to a single, - 
poorly defined – point.  Are they dishonest? 
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 G. R. Sullivan – Fraud – The Latest Law Commission Proposals. JoCL 67 (139) 
27
 Criminal Law Act 1977 s1 
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The second big change which needs to be discussed is the straightforward 
removal of the concept of deception from the offence of Fraud.  While the 
exorcism of deception will bring cheer to those prosecuting fraud by sole use 
of a computer – which cannot be deceived30 - it leaves fraud dangerously 
dependant on the concept of dishonesty.  When the Law Commission 
Revision Committee published it‟s eighth report concerning the (then) new 
Theft Act 1968 to replace the Larceny Act 1916, it debated the concept of 
dishonesty which replaced „fraudulently‟ as a MR requirement.  It said 
 
„‟Dishonesty‟ seems to us a better word than „fraudulently‟.  The question 
„Was this dishonest?‟ is easier for a jury to answer than „Was this fraudulent?‟.  
Dishonesty is something which laymen can easily recognise when they see it, 
whereas „fraud‟ may seem to involve technicalities which have to be explained 
by a lawyer.31 
 
Perhaps this sentiment was still very much on Parliaments mind when the FA 
2006 was passed, but in spite of being part of the Theft Act 1968 for nearly 40 
years, there is still no satisfactory definition of dishonesty in criminal law and 
juries are left to depend on the common law description which comes from the 
cases of Feely32 and Ghosh.  Interestingly, Ghosh concerned charges of 
deception offences, but the problem faced by the jury, did not concern the 
definitional elements of deception, but of dishonesty. The reasoning behind 
the Ghosh test33 is (in)famous – faced with no legal34 definition of dishonesty 
Lord Lane CJ instructed the jurors  
 
`There are, sad to say, infinite categories of dishonesty. It is for you.  Jurors of 
the past, and, whilst we have criminal law in the future, jurors in the future to 
set the standards of honesty.‟ 35  
 
The test, and the comments by Lord Lane, assume that there is a standard of 
honesty in society that plainly isn‟t there.  It also assumes that this nepherous 
quality of „honesty‟ can then be used to define „dishonesty‟ – but as we have 
no recognised legal definition of the one, ergo, we have no definition of the 
other.  The concept of dishonesty continues to exasperate lawyers and 
academics alike with it‟s forays into (previously) immoral rather than strictly 
illegal behaviour,36 and juries confusion over the perceived dishonesty of the 
conduct as opposed to the dishonesty of the defendants state of mind. 
However, far from the Law Commission and Parliament shrinking from this 
unfathomable concept, it has been included as a major definitional component 
in an important and long awaited Act which is likely to be well used and the 
actus reus of which, as we have seen, is foolishly easy to commit.  What now 
stands between the CV padder or the market trader and a fraud conviction is 
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 See fn 5 above and note s2(5) FA 2006 „with or without human intervention‟ which appears designed 
to put this problem beyond doubt. 
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 Criminal Law  Revision Committee, Eighth Report, Cmnd. 2977 at para 39 
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 R v Feely [1973] QB 530 
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 The defendants honesty is a question of fact for the jury to decide – R v Feely [1973] 1 All ER 341 
35
 [1982] 2 All ER 689 at 691 
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 See Hinks[2000] 3 WLR 1590 
how the jury in that particular case choose to define the mens rea of the 
offence.  This, it must be remembered, is a retrospective definition, as the 
jury, (the Reasonable Man) will not sit and decide what dishonesty (or 
honesty) is until trial, months and possibly years after the actus reus took 
place.  It is therefore impossible for the defendant to know in advance of his 
trial the level of honesty which he had to live up to in order to avoid breaching 
the criminal law of fraud under the FA 2006.  A retrospective offence, such as 
one based on dishonesty is likely to be, may well be in breach of the principle 
of legal certainty contained within Articles 5 and 7 of the European 
Convention of Human Rights.  This fact was acknowledged by the Joint 
Parliamentary Committee on Human Rights in their 2004/5 session, but the 
Committee also decided that  
 
„the new general offence of fraud is not a general dishonesty offence, rather, it 
embeds dishonesty as an element in the definition of the offence.‟37   
 
It is submitted, that, as prosecutors and defendants alike have found in the 
law of Theft, the jury‟s decision on the guilt of the accused will ultimately come 
down to whether or not they think his conduct was „dishonest‟ – whatever that 
means. In a case like that of Boggeln v Williams38 where a Ghosh direction 
may have to be given, juries will have to be reminded that they are trying to 
perceive the state of mind of the defendant and not the honesty - or otherwise 
- of his conduct.   Still, the point is made, a celebrity sending spam to endorse 
a   charity he has never heard of claiming „it changed my life – give now to 
help others‟  and waiving his fee, is unlikely to be guilty of a s2 offence.  A 
trader „over-egging‟ the wonders of his product with an eye to a profit may be 
caught, even if he claims that his advertisement was „mere puff‟.  Here the 
actus reas is present on both occasions, the other two mens rea 
requirements, knowledge that the statement is or may be untrue or misleading 
and intention to make a gain or loss likewise.  The only thing that separates 
them is whether the jury thinks each is guilty of what Lord Lane CJ referred to 
as „sharp practice‟39.  Ormerod40  wonders if trades or professions traditionally 
seen as „less honest‟ in popular modern mythology – such as second hand 
car salesmen or estate agents or politicians will be treated less favourably by 
juries or whether exaggerated claims for a products benefits, previously firmly 
in the caveat emptor camp are now of legislative concern.  He asks, quite 
simply, „Is it fraud?‟ 
 
As far back as 1703 English courts have been quoted as saying, „the law 
ought not to indict a man for making a fool of another.‟41   The Fraud Act  
2006, while largely to be welcomed, may make it much more of a possibility. 
 
In it‟s Fraud and Deception Consultation Paper number 155, the Law 
Commission took issue with conduct being characterised as dishonest under 
Ghosh which did not in fact give rise to civil liability,  
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 Joint Parliamentary Committee on Human Rights Fourteenth Report. 
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 R v Ghosh [1982] 2 All ER 698 at 691 
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 The Fraud Act 2006 – Criminalising Lying . [2007] Crim LR Mar 193 - 219 
41
 Jones 1703 
 
„In general, we believe that the criminal law should take a robust view of what 
is to be allowed in the market place; and in particular we think it wrong that 
conduct which is not actionable (that is, which gives rise to no remedy at civil 
law) should be regarded as a substantive crime of dishonesty.‟42  
 
It is unlikely that the market trader would be open to an action for 
misrepresentation, but, it could be argued, that it is unlikely that a charge of 
fraud would be brought against him either.  Any legislation depends on the 
prosecution using it wisely in order not to bring the legislation, and the system 
itself, into disrepute.  It may be however, that the Fraud Act 2006 has gone 
too far, and it‟s quest for breadth and in order to prophylacticly envelope those 
who delight in new ways of fraudulent behaviour it has built on the somewhat 
shaky foundations of a concept the meaning of which continues to confound 
it‟s champions and it‟s detractors alike. 
 
COOOOMMME   OOONNN   KEEEEVIIIIINNNNNN!!!!!!! 
 
(like a football chant – it‟s not easy to spell!) 
  
 
 
 
 
 
(The article will now progress to highlight some of the key problems of the 
new Act.) 
 
 
 
(Ignore this bit: (I found it earlier and liked it, but have nowhere else to put it at 
present!) 
Second part – what is e-crime, problems:  
 
Jerry Fishenden, National Technology Officer for Microsoft UK pointed 
CLSR (2007), volume 23, issue 3, pages 211-226 Microsoft and the open 
source community agree more must be done to make reporting cyber-crime easier, 
part 1.12.  
We believe it is necessary to have as easy a reporting mechanism as possible 
so that when people are victims of cyber-crime or attempted cyber-crime there 
is a streamlined reporting structure and ideally one body with responsibility for 
receiving those complaints and having appropriate resources to investigate 
and potentially initiate prosecutions where appropriate. My understanding is 
that the United States does have a single point of reporting established by the 
FBI back in the late 1990s, the Internet Crime Complaints Centre, which takes 
some 10,000 plus complaints a year and has the authority and resources to 
actually look into those complaints….Establishing that type of scheme, as 
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happened in the States, would also enable us to get a much better grip on the 
scale of the problem in the UK. If I walked in to a police station tomorrow to 
report an on-line phishing attack, would it be treated in the same way as an 
attempted pick-pocketing? Is that a model we want to move to or do we want 
to have cyber-crime handled at the centre? 
 
